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ARGUMENT
MRS. ATHERLEY'S CLAIM MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CANFIELD
THEORY OF LIABILITY.
As

Mrs. Atherley

set

forth

in

her

brief,

evidence

was

presented to the trial court sufficient to state a claim under the
theory of liability set forth in Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841
P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied,
Mrs. Atherley

showed

that

she

had

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

stepped

and

slipped

on

a

strawberry that was approximately six feet away from the table
holding Albertson's strawberry display.

(R at 92.)

She produced

testimony that there were no barriers around the strawberry display
to prevent strawberries from rolling to the floor, that there were
no

floor

mats

around

the

strawberry

display,

strawberries were displayed in open containers.

and

that

the

(R at 92 through

93.) Canfield does not require that Mrs. Atherley demonstrate that
Albertson's

method

of

displaying

strawberries

was

"uniquely

dangerous."

The fact that Albertson's may have displayed other

produce in a dangerous or hazardous manner does not render their
display of strawberries acceptable.
A.
Mrs. Atherley Produced Evidence Sufficient For The Fact
Finder To Conclude That Albertson's Had Chosen A Method Of Display
That Was Dangerous When Combined With The Foreseeable Patterns Of
Customer Conduct Or When Simply Acted Upon By The Law Of Gravity.
Mrs. Atherley had no obligation to show that the strawberry
display was in any way unique.

The strawberry display was no more

unique than the farmer's pack display of lettuce in Canfield.
Selling lettuce in farmer's packs was certainly not unique to
Albertson's.

It was different and more dangerous, however, than
1

the alternate method of display that Albertson's also used, that is
selling lettuce wrapped in cellophane. The identical situation was
presented

with

strawberries.

Albertson's

elected

methods

of

displaying

It sold strawberries in closed containers but also

sold strawberries in open containers, displayed on inclined tables
with no barriers sufficient to catch the strawberries in the event
they

were

acted

upon

by

the

force

of

gravity

or

bumped

by

customers.
Albertson's would place a burden on Mrs. Atherley to provide
"expert"
dangerous.

testimony

that

Albertson's

method

of

display

was

That is not a conclusion requiring expert testimony but

is, instead, a fact so within the common knowledge and experience
of the lay person that a jury, the only proper fact finder in this
case, could determine that the method of display was dangerous.
Mrs. Atherley also has no burden to show that Albertson's method of
display differed from display practices in other stores.

The fact

that every other store may also use dangerous methods of display
does not render those methods less dangerous. The Canfield opinion
does

not

condition.

require

expert

testimony

to establish

the

dangerous

The standard of care in this type of case is not

established by an industry standard.
The evidence presented by Mrs. Atherley went well beyond her
"allegations of the store owner's negligence."

She provided clear

evidence, through the testimony of Albertson's own witness, that it
was foreseeable to Albertson's that strawberries would end up on

2

the floor either through a pattern of customer conduct or by merely
rolling or being bumped to the floor.

(R at 66.)

Albertson's was just as aware of the hazards posed by the
strawberries as it was the hazards created by the farmer's pack
lettuce display in Canfield.

Albertson's points out that in the

Canfield case, it placed disposal boxes around the farmer's pack
display, a measure it did not take with other produce displays.
Albertson's produced testimony that it tried to remedy the hazard
posed by the open strawberry displays by placing barriers around
the incline displays and mats on the floors next to the display
cases.

These

actions

would

have

absolutely

no

purpose

if

Albertson's was not aware of the potential hazard created by its
method of display. Mrs. Atherley disputed that there were barriers
sufficient to keep strawberries from rolling or being bumped off of
the display onto the floor and disputed the claim that their were
mats directly next to the display case.

The fact that Albertson's

has provided evidence that it took these measures to try to remedy
a dangerous method of display, establishes that it was aware of the
risks created by that method of display.

The Canfield analysis is

directly on point and the facts of Mrs. Atherley's fall are almost
identical to those of the plaintiff in Canfield.
B.
The
Canfield
Theory
Of
Liability
Applies
In
Mrs. Atherley's Case And Does Not Impose Strict Liability On Store
Owners. Albertson's Interpretation Of The Canfield Requirements
Seeks Absolute Immunity For Store Owners Against The Claims Of
Customers Who Could Not Possibly Meet The Burden That Albertson's
Interpretation Would Impose.
It is an insupportable stretch of reason for Albertson's to
argue that applying the Canfield theory to Mrs. Atherley's claim
3

would impose absolute liability on store owners. Canfield does not
impose absolute liability on store owners.

Mrs. Atherley's claim

has met the Canf ield requirements and, therefore, does not seek the
imposition of absolute liability.

If Mrs. Atherley's claim is

allowed to go back to the trial court, she will still have to
present her case to the jury and persuade the jury that Albertson's
method of display was dangerous.
In fact, if the court were to apply Albertson's interpretation
of the Canfield theory, store owners would be afforded virtually
absolute

immunity

from the

claims of customers

who

could not

possibly meet that burden because of the impossibility of gaining
the type of knowledge that Albertson's would require them to obtain
and to present as evidence before they could even present their
cause to the jury.
C.
Albertson's "Proximate Cause" Argument Is A Red Herring.
Proximate Cause Is Established To The Same Degree As It Was In
Canfield.
In its "proximate cause" argument Albertson's again attempts
to impose the burdens of the first theory of liability on those
seeking redress under the Canfield theory.

Albertson's would have

this court uphold the trial court's Summary Judgment determination
because Mrs. Atherley cannot show precisely how the strawberry that
she

fell

on

came

to

be

on

the

floor.

In

all

likelihood,

Mrs. Atherley may never be able to establish that fact.

Under the

Canf ield theory, however, it is not necessary for her to do so.

It

is precisely that type of unreasonable burden that the Canfield
theory rejects.

Even proximate cause is a question of fact to be
4

determined by the fact finder.

Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595

(Utah App. 1993) . The jury can determine proximate cause from the
facts that Mrs. Atherley will be able to present and could make a
determination from the facts that she has already presented.

The

kind of wild speculation suggested by Albertson's would not be
necessary for a jury to reach such a conclusion.
Albertson's brought

the strawberries

We know that

into the store, chose to

display them openly, and knew of the hazard presented by that open
display.

There was no more evidence in Canfield that the lettuce

leaf came directly from the farmer's pack display of lettuce than
there is that the strawberry came directly from the open display of
strawberries. Albertson's speculation that the strawberry may have
come out of a closed container of strawberries is no different than
alleging that the lettuce leaf came from a head of lettuce that may
have been loosely wrapped in cellophane, or opened by a customer
and discarded where the plaintiff in Canfield fell, or even, as
Albertson's suggests, brought into the store from the outside by a
customer.

The facts presented by Mrs. Atherley do not present any

greater challenge to the jury than did the facts in Canfield.
D.
The Trial Court Improperly Applied The Traditional Theory
Of Liability Which It Never Saw As Separate From The Canfield
Theory.
It was apparent throughout this proceeding that both the trial
court and Albertson's were very uncomfortable with the Canfield
theory of liability and its fair application.
Albertson's
traditional

are
theory

apparently
of

more

comfortable

liability which
5

The trial court and

acts

applying

as a bar

the

to most

plaintiffs. The Canfield theory, as Mrs. Atherley has amply shown,
applies to her case which is virtually identical factually to the
Canfield case.

Mrs. Atherley's claim cannot survive under the

traditional theory, but in light of Canfield, it does not have to.
CONCLUSION
Canfield is directly on point with Mrs. Atherley's claim which
meets

all

of

the

standards

set

by

Canf ield.

Mrs. Atherley

presented facts to the trial court sufficient to defeat Summary
Judgment.

She presented facts sufficient for a jury to make a

determination

that

Albertson's

is

injuries under the Canfield theory.

liable

for

Mrs. Atherley's

It is also critical to keep in

mind that it should not have been necessary for Mrs. Atherley to
present

her entire

case

in order to defeat

Summary Judgment.

Additional facts can certainly be developed before trial.

The

facts presented by Mrs. Atherley to the trial court, however, were
sufficient to defeat Albertson's Summary Judgment motion. She was,
however,, granted no deference by the trial court.

Albertson's is

arguing for absolute immunity for store owners by asking this court
to render an interpretation of Canfield that would deny plaintiffs
the very remedy that this court determined plaintiffs were entitled
to have in store owner liability cases where they were under such
an enormous disadvantage under the traditional theory of liability.
The trial court improperly granted Albertson's Motion For
Summary Judgment.

This court should reverse the trial court's

decision and remand Mrs. Atherley's claim to be tried under the
Canfield theory.
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